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COMPETENT CAPITAL REPRESENTATION:
THE NECESSITY OF KNOWING AND HEEDING
WHAT JURORS TELL US ABOUT MITIGATION
John H. Blume*
Sheri Lynn Johnson**
Scott E. Sundby***

I.

INTRODUCTION

At the conclusion of the penalty phase-after the evidence is heard,
the closing arguments given and the instructions read-the jurors enter
the jury room faced with a binary choice: each juror must decide
whether the defendant should live or die. Unlike the decision the jurors
made during the guilt-or-innocence phase of the proceedings, however,
this decision is not, at its core, a determination of fact, for example, did
the defendant "do it," but a moral and normative choice--does he
deserve to die?' While there are antecedent factual determinations jurors
must make, including the existence of a statutory aggravating
circumstance, the final decision the jurors must make is not factual in
nature. As the courts have noted, this is an "awesome responsibility,"
and the jury must make a "reasoned morar' decision whether life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole or the death penalty is the
appropriate punishment.2
*

John H. Blume, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School and Director, Cornell Death

Penalty Project.
** Sheri Lynn Johnson, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School and Assistant Director,
Cornell Death Penalty Project.
*** Scott E. Sundby, Sydney and Frances Lewis Professor of Law, Washington & Lee School
of Law.
I. We use the masculine pronoun advisedly; almost all persons facing the death penalty are
men.

2. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he
sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's
background, character, and crime .... "); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329-30 (1985)

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1035

It is also an awesome responsibility to shape the defendant's case
for life. The job of defense counsel is to provide the jury with the most
sympathetic facts and the most persuasive interpretation of the relevant
facts. Our understanding of how this task can be accomplished has
changed remarkably in the last twenty-five years, in large part because
of the data that is now available about how juries think about the
question of penalty. The defense bar, as well as the courts that review
the performance of defense counsel, have gradually come to recognize
the components of competent capital representation, and the 2003
revision of the ABA Guidelinesfor the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases3 ("ABA Guidelines") attempts
to comprehensively address minimal standards for effective assistance in
capital cases.
This emerging understanding of what constitutes effective
assistance in death penalty cases goes far beyond eliminating the
"abysmal lawyer" from capital representation. The "abysmal lawyer"
cases-tales of sleeping lawyers, drunk lawyers, racist lawyers, or
lawyers literally doing nothing-have highlighted the critical need for
competent capital defense attorneys, but the developing consensus has
turned not on the avoidance of various species of misconduct, but on the
necessity of undertaking certain fundamental investigative steps. The
Supplementary Guidelinesfor the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams
in Death Penalty Cases4 ("Supplementary Guidelines") are a significant
step in capturing for courts and lawyers what have emerged as the
professional norms for preparing a capital case.
By adopting a "multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary" approach that
stresses the need for a capital defense team to think broadly, creatively,
and deeply about mitigation, the Supplementary Guidelines are on firm
empirical ground. Indeed, a rather rich store of empirical data on
mitigation exists and there is much that it can teach us. This Article
draws upon the data to explore the nature of mitigation and how it
relates to capital representation in three basic steps. In Part II, we
examine what the studies teach us about how a case in mitigation should
(quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971)) (noting that "'jurors [are] confronted
with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death').
3. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003), in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003) [hereinafter ABA
GUIDELINES].
The
ABA
GUIDELINES
are
also
available
online
at

http://www.abanet.org/deathpenalty/resources/docs/2003Guidelines.pdf.
4. See SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES FOR THE MITIGATION FUNCTION OF DEFENSE TEAMS
IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, in 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY
GUIDELINES].

COMPETENTCAPITAL REPRESENTATION

20081

be investigated to ensure that all of the pieces for a defendant's "case for
life" are uncovered and fully developed. Part III looks at the empirical
findings to see how a capital defense team might best fit together the
pieces of mitigation based on what themes and which witnesses the
studies show are best received. Finally, in Part IV we look at mitigation
in light of who ultimately will be reacting to and using the mitigationjurors-and what the empirical studies reveal about how different types
of jurors respond to mitigation and are likely to use mitigating evidence
in their deliberations.

II.

INVESTIGATING AND DEVELOPING THE CASE FOR LIFE

When faced with the moral and normative choice--does the
defendant deserve to die-it is wrong to dismiss the role of facts
entirely. Facts do count, but they count in different ways than they do in
the guilt phase. The empirical information-primarily the Capital Jury
Project ("CJP") studies-reveals that many jurors make the life or death
decision based on a misunderstanding of the law. Most significantly,
many jurors believe--despite the judge's instructions-that they must
impose the death penalty if the crime was premeditated, or "heinous," or
intentional. But even aside from the lawless ways the facts sometimes
count, they also matter in important ways that are consistent with the law
of the relevant jurisdiction. The empirical studies reveal that three
primary considerations drive juror decision-making at the penalty phase
of a capital trial. First, many jurors' penalty determination is based on
their perception of how "bad" the crime was.6 Second, many jurors make
the life or death decision based on how dangerous they think the
defendant is. 7 Finally, jurors choose the appropriate penalty based on
their assessment of the defendant's remorse (or the lack thereof).8
5. See John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen P. Garvey, Lessons from the Capital
Jury Project, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 144, 159-61 (Stephen P. Garvey
ed., 2003); see also William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project:Rationale, Design, and Preview
of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1091 (1995); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation
in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 1542 (1998) [hereinafter
Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation].
6. See, e.g., Mark Constanzo & Sally Constanzo, Jury Decision Making in the Capital
Penalty Phase, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 188-89 (1992); William S. Geimer & Jonathan
Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty
Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1,46 (1988).
7. See John H. Blume, Stephen P. Garvey & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Study, Future
Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At Issue," 86 CORNELL L. REv. 397, 398 (2001);
Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation,supranote 5, at 1542.
8. See Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, But Was He Sorry?: The
Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1599, 1631-33 (1998); Stephen P.
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A skeptical reader might ask, "What do any of those three issues
have to do with mitigation?" The considerations appear to be driven by
the facts of the underlying crime. But the skeptic would be wrong. Each
consideration, the empirical studies also show, can be substantially
influenced by the evidence in mitigation. Successfully humanizing the
defendant through the mitigating evidence, for example, leads jurors to
believe that the crime was not as heinous. It also makes jurors less likely
to view the defendant as dangerous, and less likely to see him as
remorseless. 9 A comprehensive, consistent, coherent, and credible
presentation of mitigation evidence can-and often does-influence a
juror's determination on all three issues.
Thus "facts," as properly understood for the life or death sentencing
determination, encompass much more than the "facts" as understood in
non-capital trials. The juror's life or death decision will hinge on
whether the information that has been presented in aggravation and in
mitigation has persuaded an individual juror as to which of the two
punishments is the appropriate punishment. 10 In short, credibly telling
the defendant's story can make the difference between life and death. 1
The CJP studies reveal that many different types of mitigation
resonate with jurors. Low intelligence, mental illness, child abuse,
extreme poverty, remorse, lack of a significant prior record, and lesser
culpability are just some of the categories of mitigation that, in a
particular case, can lead jurors to choose life over death.12 As one
researcher put it:
Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 26, 58-59 (2000)
[hereinafter Garvey, Emotional Economy]; Scott E. Sundby, The CapitalJury and Absolution: The
Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1557, 1560
(1998).
9. See Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation, supranote 5, at 1539, 1561-66.
10. This is not meant to downplay the importance of thoroughly investigating the facts of the
crime. That investigation is also critical, especially given that more than one hundred death
sentenced inmates have been wrongfully convicted. Innocence and the Death Penalty,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=412 (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). But regardless of the
defense team's assessment of the likelihood of an acquittal, a thorough investigation into all
possible avenues of mitigation is essential. This is true for a variety of reasons. First, if the case goes
to trial, most defendants will be found guilty. And while residual doubt is a powerful mitigating
circumstance in the abstract, once jurors conclude the defendant is guilty, they rarely harbor any
residual doubt at the sentencing phase of the trial. See Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation,supra
note 5, at 1563. Second, the investigation for the penalty phase can not wait until the defense team is
able to make an intelligent decision as to the prospects of an acquittal. A meaningful mitigation
investigation is a labor intensive process and must begin as soon as counsel is appointed. Third, the
mitigation investigation will frequently uncover information that is supportive of an overall defense
theory that the client was not guilty or is less culpable than other persons charged in the offense.
11. See Garvey, Emotional Economy, supra note 8, at 63.
12. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation, supranote 5, at 1539, 1564-66.
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Telling a defendant's story does appear to have its intended
emotional effect. ... If a juror believed that the defendant

experienced the torment of abuse as a child, labored under the
burden of a mental defect or mental retardation, was emotionally
disturbed, battled with alcoholism.., was a loner in the world, or
had generally gotten
a raw deal in life, the usual response was
3
pity.'
or
sympathy
But, as with everything else in death penalty litigation, it is not
quite that simple. It is not enough to present a case in mitigation; the
defense case for life must resonate with jurors. It must be
comprehensive, consistent, coherent and credible. 14 For example, a juror
in a capital case will frequently reject a "half-baked" case of mental
illness, a consideration which-in the abstract-is considered by jurors
to be highly mitigating. On the other hand, a truly compelling case of
drug addiction tied to events in the defendant's life and its role in the
crime can result in a juror deciding that life without parole is the
appropriate punishment.' 5 In short, the devil is in the details.
It is essential, therefore, that the defense team-and it must be a
team effort16-approach the search for mitigation with an open mind.
One of the most serious mistakes the defense team can make is to decide
on a theory of the case too quickly. A persuasive theory of the caseincluding the defense theory at both guilt-or-innocence and the penalty
phases of capital trial-can only be determined after a comprehensive
investigation has been conducted. While other contributors to this
volume will explain the process of conducting the investigation in more
detail, this point cannot be overemphasized. The defense team must
gather the full picture of the client's life and background and the
circumstances of the crime. In short, "the good, the bad and the ugly"
must be fully pursued on a multi-generational level.

13. Garvey, Emotional Economy, supra note 8, at 57 (footnotes omitted); see also Michelle E.
Barnett et al., When Mitigation Evidence Makes a Difference: Effects of Psychological Mitigating
Evidence on Sentencing Decisions in Capital Trials, 22 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 751, 754, 762-65 (2004)
(using ten different vignettes to demonstrate that factors such as severe abuse as a child and mental
retardation mitigated the likelihood of a death sentence).
14. See John H. Blume & Pamela Blume Leonard, Principles of Developing and Presenting
Mental Health Evidence in Criminal Cases, CHAMPION, Nov. 2000, at 63, 63.
15. See Barnett et al., supra note 13, at 762, 765; see also Alex Kotlowitz, In the Face of
Death, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 6, 2003, at 32 (telling the story of a jury which ultimately decided to
give a drug addicted defendant a life sentence over the death penalty).
16.

SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at Guideline 4.1.
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This process includes interviews with multiple informants and
obtaining any and all social history documents. 17 Without a
comprehensive investigation, the defense team cannot choose or present
the most persuasive theory of the case. The defendant's family members,
neighbors, friends, teachers, coaches, jailers and correctional officers,
treating physicians or mental health professionals-among others,
depending on the defendant's life history-must be identified and
interviewed.' 8 The team must gather all available social history records
including, but often not limited to, birth records, family medical records,
school records, social services records, military records, and prison
records. 19 In short, the defendant's life must be examined from a variety
of perspectives with the benefit of multiple sources.2 ° Without this
searching investigation, the empirical studies demonstrate that a juror is
much more likely to embrace the prosecution's theory of the case, which
is invariably the same: the defendant is a dangerous, remorseless
sociopath who has committed a vile crime-and must die.
This process must include the gathering of "stories" or "vignettes"
for the purpose of making the mitigation real. The juror interviews
conducted as part of the CJP make this clear. A specific story of a
particular horrific instance of abuse, for example, resonates with jurors
more than general assertions that the defendant was abused. The same is
true of most other forms of mitigation including mental illness, low
intellectual functioning, and good character evidence. A picture-even a
word picture-speaks a thousand words. The defense team must search
for these vignettes in interviews, documents and records. 21 These
17. See id. at Guideline 10.11.
18. See id; see also John H. Blume, Mental Health Issues in Criminal Cases: The Elements of
a Competent and Reliable Mental Health Examination, ADvOC., Aug. 1995, at 3.6; Blume &
Leonard, supranote 14, at 64-65.
19. Blume & Leonard, supra note 14, at 64.
20. See id. at 64-65.
21. A good example of the search for records making a difference can be found in Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-98 (2000). In concluding that trial counsel's investigation was both
unreasonable and prejudicial, the Court relied upon the following excerpt from Williams's juvenile
records:
The home was a complete wreck.... There were several places on the floor where
someone had had a bowel movement. Urine was standing in several places in the
bedrooms. There were dirty dishes scattered over the kitchen, and it was impossible to
step any place on the kitchen floor where there was no trash.... The children were all
dirty, and none of them had on under-pants. Noah and Lula [Williams' parents] were so
intoxicated, they could not find any clothes for the children, nor were they able to put the
clothes on them.... The children had to be put in Winslow Hospital, as four of them, by
that time, were definitely under the influence of whiskey.
Id. at 395 n.19.
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vignettes are also important in the way in which jurors decide cases.
Jurors resort to a story-telling model, and the smaller stories about a
defendant's life aid jurors in creating a larger more "defendant-friendly"
counter story to the prosecution's story about the crime.22
There are other essential components to a constitutionally adequate
investigation. First, the defense team must secure appropriate expert
assistance, primarily from mental health experts.23 It is important to
approach the issue of expert selection in an informed manner. It is
critical that experts not be retained until the initial social history
investigation is completed or at least well underway. Deciding too
quickly on an expert can be as crippling to the development of an
effective mitigation case as deciding too quickly on a theory of the case.
Experts must be selected with an eye towards their expertise in the
particular themes of the case. A generalist is often of little use. In that
regard, it is also essential that counsel not base their case on experts who
do appear to have a "stake" in a particular outcome. The empirical
evidence reveals that jurors are skeptical of an expert witness who is
retained "after the fact," for example, after the client has committed the
murder and is in jail awaiting trial. Some jurors view such experts as
"hired guns" who are simply parroting what the defendant's lawyers
have retained them to say.24 This is not to say that expert witnesses
retained after the fact are not useful to the defense; they can be-if they
are used correctly. Experts of this nature can be useful in several ways.
First, they can be invaluable in guiding counsel to other potential sources
of information that support the overall case in mitigation. They can also
be effective witnesses if-as will be discussed later-their testimony is
corroborated by other witnesses and documents bolstering their
conclusions. 25 But the most effective expert testimony often comes from
someone who had some connection with the defendant before the crime.
For example, if a defendant has a history of mental illness, and was
treated by a mental health professional before the crime, that individual

22. See Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert
Testimony on JurorDecision Making in CapitalSentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 267, 273-

74 (2001); Wayne A. Logan, When Balance and Fairness Collide: An Argument for Execution
Impact Evidence in CapitalTrials, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 46-47 (1999).

23. However, it is essential that the core defense team also have at least one member who is
qualified by training and expertise in identifying and documenting and interpreting symptoms of
mental disorders and impairments. SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at Guideline 5.1.
24. Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An EmpiricalLook at How CapitalJuries Perceive
Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1123-26 (1997).

25. See id.
at 1163-64.
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will have more credibility with the jury.26 This trial reality highlights the
need for a full and complete investigation.
One issue which arises at the investigation stage in many cases is
whether the defense team should utilize neuroimaging. This question
does not have a one-size-fits-all answer. The upsides are significant. If,
for example, a theme of the mitigation case is brain damage or
neurological impairment, an MRI scan demonstrating an abnormal brain
can be very effective. The empirical evidence indicates that jurors are
persuaded by this type of evidence. On the other hand, many types of
brain dysfunction are not detectable through neuroimaging. A "normal"
brain scan can negate other clinically sound evidence of brain
dysfunction detected through sophisticated neuropsychological testing.
Jurors are more likely to dismiss this evidence if the "picture" of the
brain does not "reveal" the impairment.2 7 Thus, there is no easy solution.
The only possible generalization is that the defense team should proceed
very cautiously and only utilize brain imaging after the investigation is
complete, neuropsychological testing has been conducted, and an
appropriate expert-usually a neurologist-has advised counsel that
there is a substantial likelihood of a "positive" result.
Finally, the defense team must be creative and, to an extent,
visionary. The legal definition of mitigation is perhaps the best one: it is
anything which might lead a reasonable juror to find that there exists "a
basis for a sentence less than death. 28 The empirical evidence supports
this broad definition. Many different types of information resonate with
jurors and a mitigation theme that "works" in one case may not work in
another. The key is to develop an overall case which will resonate with
the "average" juror. Our knowledge of what is mitigating is not yet
complete. Times change, scientific and medical knowledge changes, and
our understanding of what jurors deem mitigating should grow as well.
This is evidenced by the recent rise in defense-based victim outreach.
Just a few years ago, many defense teams made little effort to reach out
to victims' surviving family members. The conventional wisdom was
that these individuals were the prosecution's witnesses. But, that has
changed (fortunately) and now a competent mitigation investigation
includes reaching out to the victim's family. It may not prove fruitful in
a particular case, and it is difficult to embark upon, particularly for

26. Seeid at 1126-30.
27. Blume, supra note 18.
28. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986).
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attorneys who are not used to approaching victims' family members, but
it is a necessary component of the trial preparation.
In sum, the defense team must conduct a comprehensive
investigation of the defendant's life with no preconceptions, and then
diligently and methodically follow the resulting leads. There is no
cookie-cutter approach. Defendants are unique and, for that reason, each
mitigation investigation will be unique.
III.

PUTTING TOGETHER THE CASE FOR LIFE

While it is crucial in the investigation phase not to allow one
potential theory of the case to curtail the development of facts, it is
equally critical at trial not to simply throw an assortment of mitigating
facts at the jury. Because jurors-like everyone else-make meaning of
the world through the use of stories, the question of whether to sentence
the defendant to death or to life imprisonment often depends upon
whether the prosecution story or the defense story is more compelling.29
Of course, what kinds of stories are compelling depend upon the listener
as well as the storyteller, and it seems likely that defense lawyers will
hear mitigation stories differently than will the typical juror. Fortunately,
the CJP data, along with mock jury studies, offer significant insights into
both the question of what stories are compelling and the question of how
best to tell a given story to the kind of audience who will be making the
life or death decision.
The objective evidence adds much to three topics that defense
lawyers in the immediate aftermath of Gregg v. Georgia30 could only
guess at: the relationship between guilt and penalty phase stories; the
aspects of the state's case for death to which it is most important to
respond; and the way to structure the presentation of mitigation
evidence.
A. Integratingthe Guilt and Penalty Phase Stories
It is tempting for lawyers to think of the guilt and penalty phases as
two trials, since different legal questions are resolved in each. Some
lawyers operationalize this vision of two trials by assigning one lawyer
responsibility for each phase. Unless, however, those lawyers work very
closely with each other, this is a bad division of labor, and it certainly
29. See Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide Death: Guilt Is
Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
1011, 1053-55 (2001); Krauss & Sales, supra note 22, at 273-74.
30. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty).
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reflects an inaccurate perception of how-and when-the jury will
resolve the question formally assigned to the sentencing phase.
The disheartening news is that most jurors enter the penalty phase
with their minds already made up as to the appropriate sentence. 31 Thus,
the defense team that delays presentation of all its mitigating evidence
until the penalty phase does not merely struggle with the prosecution
over whose story is most persuasive; it fights an uphill battle to dislodge
32
the decision already entrenched in the minds of many of the jurors.
Therefore, competent defense counsel have long recognized the
importance of foreshadowing or frontloading mitigation themes in the
guilt phase, either through cross-examination aimed at eliciting facts that
mitigate either the heinousness of the defendant's role in the crime or his
responsibility for his actions, or by the presentation of evidence relevant
to some aspect of the mitigation theory case.33 To be clear, we are not
suggesting that counsel should frequently raise a mental health defense,
for example insanity, at the first phase; that is often a risky proposition
and should be done only in a handful of cases, but a creative defense
team can almost always find a way to present the mitigation themes in
the first phase.34
This is always difficult to do, but it is especially difficult when the
defense is actively contesting guilt. Contesting guilt has an obvious
value at the guilt phase, but it also has potential value at the penalty
phase, because residual doubt about guilt is a strong predictor of life
sentences. 35 The value of actively contesting guilt, however, must be
weighed against the frequency with which jurors are angry at defendants
who deny their involvement when evidence of guilt is strong. A denial
defense at the guilt or innocence phase is more than twice as likely to
result in a death sentence as compared to cases where the defendant
acknowledges his guilt from the start, particularly when the defendant
31. See Bentele & Bowers, supra note 29, at 1019.
32. See Wanda D. Foglia, They Know Not What They Do: Unguided and Misguided
Discretion in Pennsylvania Capital Cases, 20 JUST. Q. 187, 198 (2003) (of the jurors who chose
death before the sentencing phase began, seventy-five percent never wavered from their choice).
33. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at Guideline 10.10.1 & commentary.
34. An excellent example of frontloading took place in the trial of Susan Smith. Ms. Smith
was on trial for the murder of her two children. The prosecution presented evidence that Ms.
Smith's motive for killing her children was to pave the way for her marriage to a rich local
businessman with whom she was sexually involved. To rebut the alleged motive, the defense called
an expert witness who detailed Smith's history of sexual abuse, depression, and suicidality and
opined that Smith intended to kill herself and her children while suffering from major depression.
Ms. Smith was found guilty, but at the sentencing phase the jury promptly returned a life verdict.
Life Term Given Mother Who Drowned2 Sons, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1995, at A6.
35. See Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation,supra note 5, at 1563.
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has taken the stand and testified to his innocence.3 6 In such cases, jurors
frequently dismiss the case in mitigation as just another attempt by the
defendant to avoid responsibility for his actions. In the juror's eyes, the
defense team tried to fool them at the first phase by denying his guilt,
and now he is trying to fool them again with the mitigation evidence to
cheat the executioner.
Sometimes the tension between contesting guilt and acknowledging
responsibility can be bridged by partial defenses; a defendant may
contest his mental state, or his role in a multi-defendant crime without
necessarily incurring the jury's wrath when he "switches" to a focus on
mitigation in the penalty phase.3 7 Likewise, a defense that acknowledges
involvement in the killing but denies that the defendant was guilty of
capital murder appears to escape this backlash, at least where the defense
is plausible on the facts.38
To flag the importance of beginning the presentation of the
mitigation story in the guilt phase and the (related) importance of
consistency between guilt and penalty phase stories obviously does not
resolve the tensions between "running for the roses" at guilt, and giving
the defendant the best chance at a life sentence. What the empirical
evidence does do is to suggest how important it is to coordinate the
presentations at each phase so that the story the jury hears from the
39
defense is internally coherent and consistent.
B. Combatingthe Prosecution'sCasefor Death
In a very real sense, the "end" to the story is written by the jurors.
But what is the right end? Because a capital trial is a struggle between
competing stories, the prosecution story is scripted to lead to the
conclusion that the correct end to the story is a death sentence for the
defendant, and the defense story to the conclusion that the only right end
is a life sentence. To win the battle of stories requires considering what
the elements of the prosecution's story are and how to undercut the
persuasiveness of those elements, as well as how to weave the best story
for life.
While every aggravation case is slightly different, we know from
the CJP data that there are three stock elements to those stories, elements
36. Sundby, supra note 8, at 1575.
37. See id. at 1585.
38. Id. at 1593.
39. See id. at 1593-94 (asserting that jurors are likely to perceive the defendant who fails to
take any responsibility in the guilt phase as continuing to deny responsibility in the sentencing phase
if he then offers mitigation focusing on child abuse, substance abuse, or other impairments).
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that every capital defense team must attempt to combat. As discussed
above, because the best predictors of a death sentence are vileness of the
crime, future dangerousness, and lack of remorse, putting together the
case for life should always include attempts to undercut these factors.4 °
1. Vileness
The more vile the jury perceives the crime to be, the more likely the
defendant is to be sentenced to death. 4' At first blush, this sounds pretty
discouraging: in many cases not very much can be done about the facts
of the crime. Moreover, in most cases, some prosecutor has already
decided that the underlying crime was vile enough to get the death
penalty, so the defense attorney rarely is confronting a case that the
factory worker, the clerk at the convenience store, or the stay-at-home
mom will hear about and say, "Oh, that's not so bad!"
Nonetheless, at the margin, the juror's estimation of the vileness of
a case can be shifted upward or downward. We know that photographs
increase perceptions of vileness.42 For this reason, even in jurisdictions
that have very expansive views of when the probative value outweighs
the prejudicial effect, it is worth objecting to the introduction of
photographs; one can never be certain the trial judge will not exclude
them. In the alternative, moving for the exclusion of repetitive
photographs, or the exclusion of color photographs, or the exclusion of
autopsy photographs may be fruitful; such photographs contribute no
additional information to the jury, but are very likely to be
inflammatory.
We also know that perceptions of vileness are influenced by some
attributes of the victim. Generally, it is not a good strategy to attack the
victim, or deprecate his place in life; it does not appear that jurors
respond differently to the killing of a gas station attendant than to the
killing of a bank vice president. However, jurors do view a crime as less
vile-and less deserving of death-when a victim's own actions at the
time of the crime put him or her at risk, or in some other way were
morally blameworthy.43 Thus, introducing evidence that the victim had a
40. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at Guideline 10.1 1(G)-(I).
41. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 46-47.
42. See id. at 49; William J. Bowers, Maria Sandys & Benjamin D. Steiner, Foreclosed
Impartiality in CapitalSentencing: Jurors' Predispositions,Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature
Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1498 (1998).
43. See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and
Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 364 (2003); see also Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah,
The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on ProsecutorialDecisions to Seek the Death Penalty in
South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161, 193 (2006) (stating that defendants accused of killing
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drinking problem is likely to backfire, but testimony 44that he was
drinking heavily on the night of his murder may be helpful.
We also know that victim impact testimony increases the likelihood
of a death sentence, 45 probably because jurors think the crime is worse
when they have more details of its effects on the living. This is not the
place to dispute the merits of Payne v. Tennessee,46 but it is the place to
note that the increased likelihood of a death sentence that results from
victim impact testimony warrants vigilant efforts to prevent the
expansion of the "brief glimpse" into the victim's life authorized by
47

Payne.

Finally, perceptions of vileness are clearly influenced by beliefs
that the defendant acted in a premeditated way, and decreased by beliefs
that the defendant was "crazy" or was mentally impaired. 8 Of course, in
mounting an affirmative mitigation story, the defense often has other
reasons to portray the defendant as either impulsive or crazy, but the
evidence that perceptions of vileness vary with lack of premeditation and
mental abnormality underscore the importance of presenting evidence of
these impairments early on, in a persuasive way-and with explicitly
tying those impairments to the crime itself
2. Future Dangerousness
We know that future dangerousness is the second big predictor
death sentences, even in jurisdictions that do not mandate a finding
future dangerousness or even statutorily authorize its consideration
the death calculus.4 9 Jurors are also more likely to impose a sentence

of
of
in
of

strangers are six times more likely to face capital prosecution as offenders who kill friends or family
members in the same manner).
44. Both mock jury studies and empirical studies of the death penalty suggest that race is an
exception to the rule that status does not predict death sentences. One might respond that the
victim's race is an unalterable fact, and thus might as well be ignored in the preparation of the case
for life. But it may be that some of the effects of the victim's race can be diminished by presenting
white witnesses who can testify that the execution of the defendant would be a loss to them. Or one
might consider either expert testimony on the phenomenon or a "race-switching" instruction, for
example, an instruction asking the jurors to consider whether their decision would be the same if the
races of the victim and the defendant were reversed.
45. Bryan Myers & Edith Greene, The Prejudicial Nature of Victim Impact Statements:
Implicationsfor CapitalSentencing Policy, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 492, 498 (2004).
46. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
47. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at Guideline 10.11, commentary & nn.304-07.
48. See Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 6, at 188-89; Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation,
supra note 5, at 1539.
49. See Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation, supranote 5, at 1559-60; Theodore Eisenberg &
Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 7
(1993); Blume et al., supranote 7, at 398.

HOFSTRA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 36:1035

death when they believe that the defendant will not actually remain in
prison his whole life; indeed, the shorter their estimation of the time the
defendant will be incarcerated prior to release should they not sentence
him to death, the more likely they are to sentence him to death.5 ° That is,
jurors may not really prefer to execute the defendant, but they prefer his
execution to his continued threat to the safety of the community.
Now here is some good news, because in most jurisdictions, a
capital defendant not sentenced to death will be imprisoned for life, and
even in the rare jurisdiction where he will eventually be released, his
release will be significantly later than jurors believe it will be. So the
truth will, if not set the capital defendant free, at least increase the
likelihood that he will live. Repetition of the truth of incarceration for
life-as well as its incorporation into jury instructions-matters.5'
Witnesses should be encouraged to explicitly refer to the alternative of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and lawyers should
train themselves to use the entire phrase whenever speaking of the
decision before the jury.
Of course, even if they believe that the alternative to death is a
sentence of life imprisonment, a juror may be worried that the defendant
will escape. Here, the testimony of prison officials, or more often,
former prison officials concerning security conditions for inmates
sentenced to life imprisonment and the success of the applicable security
measures in the past may be necessary.52
Some jurors may also be concerned about the defendant's potential
for violence in prison. If left to judge this issue solely by inference from
the crime, most jurors will conclude that the defendant is likely to be
violent while incarcerated.53 That conclusion, however, would usually be
50. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 49, at 7.
51. Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, The Deadly Paradox of
Capital Jurors, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 371, 373 (2001) (where life without parole is the alternative to

the death penalty, jurors often do not know about it or do not believe it means the defendant will
never be released on parole). We surmise that jurors sometimes are skeptical that the sentence is life
without parole because they read in the newspapers or hear on television news reports about a
defendant sentenced to life who is granted parole or is coming up for parole. The jurors do not
understand that those inmates were sentenced prior to the time the jurisdiction adopted life without
parole as the alternative sentence to capital punishment. Counsel should consider asking the judge to
inform the jurors that the law has changed and that life without parole means just that. Indeed, due
process may require that this instruction be given if requested, see Shafer v. South Carolina, 532
U.S. 36, 39 (2001), and counsel must be imaginative and aggressive in the pursuit of other legal
theories that might lead to the same result. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at Guideline 10.11,
commentary & n.290.
52. See ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 3, at Guideline 10.11, commentary & nn.291, 309-11.
53. But cf James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen, A National Study of the FurmanCommuted Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 5
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wrong. Many defendants who cannot make the choices required to stay
out of trouble in the free world respond well to a structured environment.
An expert on adaptability to confinement (who often can also provide
the testimony on the security of the state's prisons) can disabuse the jury
of the belief that behavior on the outside predicts behavior on the inside,
and substitute a more accurate (and generally more favorable)
assessment of likely behavior while incarcerated based upon prior
behavior while incarcerated, or in some cases, while in a mental
institution, or even in the army.
The defense must also be prepared for a new hammer in the
prosecution's future dangerousness tool kit: the expert who employs the
psychopathy checklist. Nothing sounds more dangerous than a
psychopath, and jurors may be swayed by the apparently objective
nature of the scoring process.5 4 But the psychopathy checklist is junk
science, 55 and its purveyors are demonstrably mercenary, so it behooves
every defense attorney to prepare to exclude this "expert" testimony, or
to debunk it should exclusion fail.
3. Lack of Remorse
Another fatal factor is perceived lack of remorse. When the jury
believes the defendant is not remorseful, they are angry, and they also
see little of value in the defendant that is worth saving. 56 Jurors often
find evidence of a lack of remorse in the defendant's demeanor at trial,5 7
in his denial of guilt, 58 or in his failure to express regret for what he has
done.59 So what is a defendant to do? Take the stand and say how sorry
he is? No, because jurors are generally doubtful of the sincerity of the
defendant who takes the stand to declare for the first time how sorry he
is. "Yes, he's sorry now," they think. "Sorry he got caught, and sorry he
is going to fry."
So the answer to combating the story of a vile, dangerous,
remorseless killer lies at least in part in presenting evidence early in the
(1989) (concluding that the prisoners in one study were not a threat to society and performed well in
prison).
54. See John F. Edens et al., The Impact of Mental Health Evidence on Support for Capital

Punishment: Are Defendants Labeled Psychopathic Considered More Deserving of Death?, 23
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 603, 618 (2005).

55. See id.
at 617-18.
56. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 8, at 1631-33; Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation,supra
note 5, at 1560; Sundby, supra note 8, at 1560.
57. Eisenberg et al., supra note 8, at 1617; Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 51-52;
Sundby, supra note 8, at 1561-62.
58. Sundby,supra note 8, at 1575.
59. See Eisenberg et al., supranote 8, at 1617.
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trial that the defendant was remorseful. Most, though not all, defendants
are remorseful; the job is to show the defendant's remorse to the jury in
a way that convinces jurors that is genuine. Some defendants can be
convinced that they do not need to display a tough exterior; building the
trust that this is so takes time. The demeanor of mentally ill defendants,
whether medicated or unmedicated, is particularly likely to convey a
false impression of the defendant's feelings about his crime, and with
such defendants, coaching may be impossible. 60 In such cases, expert
testimony as to the causes (whether the mental illness itself or the
prescribed medications) of the defendant's appearance and its
misleading nature are likely to be helpful.
Equally important, the jury should not first hear of the defendant's
remorse when he pleads for his life. Such timing replays a very old and
well-known stock story plot: the child who apologizes for his
misbehavior to get out of the punishment a parent has assigned, or is
about to assign. It is much better to elicit evidence of remorse from the
police officer who took the defendant's statement, or the minister who
has been seeing the defendant since his arrest, or the sister who cried
about it with the defendant. With this preparation, a jury may be more
receptive to the defendant's own statements. Moreover, with such
evidence already before the jury, the lawyer can evaluate with less
whether the defendant's own testimony is likely to help or
desperation
61
hurt him.
C. Telling the Story that Createsa Reason to Choose Life
As discussed above, whether the defense's presentation during the
penalty phase convinces the jury that a life verdict is the just end to the
trial depends in part on how it fits with the story told by the defense
during the first phase and in part by the extent to which the defense has
been able to call into doubt the prosecution's story of a vile, dangerous,
and remorseless defendant. But it also depends on three aspects of the
mitigation story itself: the significance to the jury of its component parts,
the persuasiveness of the presentation of those parts, and the
compellingness of the themes uniting those parts.

60. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137 (1992) ("It is clearly possible that such side
effects [from defendant's antipsychotic medication] had an impact upon not just [defendant's]
outward appearance, but also the content of his testimony on direct or cross examination, his ability
to follow the proceedings, or the substance of his communication with counsel.").
61. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at Guideline 10.11, commentary & nn.289-94.
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1. Facts that Mitigate
The Supreme Court has now declared that the execution of persons
with mental retardation violates the Constitution.6 2 But prior to that
decision, it was clear that evidence of mental retardation was highly
mitigating. 63 This data suggests that evidence of borderline mental
retardation or other forms of cognitive impairments are important in
many cases even though the mental retardation threshold is not
satisfied. 64
Evidence that the defendant was under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance or mentally ill at the time of the crime is also
mitigating to almost half of all jurors. 65 Almost a third of jurors found
exposure to serious child abuse mitigating, and a like number found
childhood poverty mitigating.66 One could, of course, state those
findings in the opposite form, noting that a majority find neither mental
illness nor child abuse mitigating, but this emphasis would be misplaced,
given the requirement of unanimity.67 The one mitigating factor that
must be viewed with caution, however, is drug addiction, which more
jurors found aggravating than mitigating.68 Of course, if evidence of the
defendant's drug use is going to be presented to the jury anyway, it
behooves the defense lawyer to present it as sympathetically as possible.
Moreover, not all drug dependence is viewed in the same way;
69
defendants who have battled alcoholism are likely to create sympathy.
Finally, personality and pity matter. The more sympathy a juror
feels for the defendant, the more likeable he finds the defendant to be,
and the more able he is to imagine himself in the defendant's situation,
the more likely a juror is to vote for life.7 ° Conversely, fear of the
defendant drives votes for death. Thus, witnesses who can make the

62. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
63. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation,supra note 5, at 1564.
64. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004) (borderline intellectual functioning
inherently mitigating). Similarly, the Supreme Court has now precluded the execution of juveniles,
and again, prior to that decision, jurors found being under the age of eighteen very mitigating.
Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation, supra note 5, at 1564. It may be that the defendant's youth,
especially when contrasted with the maturity of co-defendants, may prove an effective organizing
theme for some mitigation.
65. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation,supra note 5, at 1564-65.
66. Id. at 1565.
67. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 373 n.5 (2000) (noting the fact that the Virginia
Supreme Court felt that mitigation evidence of the defendant's "difficult childhood" and "limited
mental capacity" would have "barely ... altered the profile" of the defendant).
68. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation,supra note 5, at 1565.
69. See Garvey, Emotional Economy, supranote 8, at 57.
70. Id. at 63 tbl.10.
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defendant appear likeable or pathetic must be sought out, and
conversely, any witness whose testimony creates fear of the defendanteven if it is in some other way favorable-must be viewed very
skeptically.
2. Persuasive Presentation of Mitigating Facts
How the facts are presented matters almost as much as the available
facts. Capital jurors often have a negative reaction to the defense's
expert witnesses. Indeed, expert witnesses accounted for two-thirds of
the negative responses from jurors who felt that defense witnesses
"backfir[ed] or were hard to believe". 71 According to the jurors, defense
experts were often nothing more than "hired guns," often failed to draw
a specific link between their testimony and the defendant's specific
impairments or actions, and often claimed72 to be able to explain human
behavior when they could not really do so.
On the other hand, when jurors did react favorably to a defense
expert called in the penalty phase, a life sentence was substantially more
likely.7 3 The lesson from these jurors is that defense experts need to be
integrated with lay testimony. "If... the expert takes the role of
accompanist and helps harmoniously explain, integrate, and provide
context to evidence presented by others, the jury is far more likely to
find the expert's testimony ...to be trusted., 74 Thus, if an expert's
testimony explains the significance of the facts recounted by family
members, this is far more valuable than either general theories or
statistical information.75 Moreover, as mentioned previously, it is
sometimes possible to counter suspicion of paid experts by utilizing the
testimony of experts who were not retained, such as psychologists who
had previously treated the defendant, or teachers who had observed his
academic struggles.
3. Themes that Link Mitigating Facts and Persuade Jurors to Vote
for Life
Understanding that jurors make sense of the world through the
creation of stories requires the competent trial lawyer to do more than
71. Sundby, supra note 24, at 1123. Sundby adds that "jurors' impressions of defense experts
were twice as likely to be negative rather than positive." Id.
72. Id. at 1125.
73. Id.at 1124.
74. Id. at 1144.
75. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at Guideline 10.11, commentary & nn.284-86;
Krauss & Sales, supra note 22, at 278 (examining the shortcomings of statistical information
compiled by expert witnesses).
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throw handfuls of mitigation at the jury, hoping someone will catch
something. A theme, or a set of related themes, is critical. Choosing a
theme requires understanding juries, and trying out various themes on
audiences that resemble juries more than do most law offices.7 6 Maybe
this defendant, even while in prison, is still capable of making a
contribution to others (or, more minimally, can really benefit from a
structured environment). Sometimes the most persuasive picture just
shows him as a human being, one who has done good and bad, and is
sorry for the bad, one who loves and is loved, someone for whom hope
is still possible. Or maybe he was never loved, never had a chance to
take the high road, never even was shown there was a high road (or
maybe he was so impaired from birth he could not see it, despite being
shown).
Without knowing the facts or the audience, no one can say which of
these stock stories is most likely to persuade, which brings us back to the
importance of a full investigation of the facts, as discussed in Part II, and
forward to the importance of selecting a jury who can hear the facts with
an open mind, as addressed below.
IV.

GIVING EFFECT TO MITIGATION IN THE JURY

ROOM

The final stage in piecing together a successful story for life is to
ensure that the twelve individuals who hear the case in mitigation will be
as receptive as possible to the defense's case for life. As social
psychology teaches us, even when we try to resolve factual disputes in
an objective and impartial fashion, we inevitably resolve ambiguity and
conflicts in a manner consistent with our defining values. 7 7 This lesson is
particularly important in the death penalty context because no choice in
the legal system draws more heavily upon a juror's values and moral
judgment than the choice between life and death verdicts. Who is sitting
in the jury box, therefore, inevitably will influence how the story for life
is presented and debated in the jury room, and this means the defense
lawyer's challenge does not end with the pretrial preparation of a
compelling case for life. The lawyer must also be adept at identifying
76. Defense teams would be wise to conduct focus groups. If funding is not available in the
relevant jurisdiction for this purpose, the defense team would still be wise to assemble a
representative group from their friends, friends of friends, neighbors, and others.
77. See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of SelfDefense (Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 36, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1012967 (discussing social psychology findings on cognition in explaining
how individuals evaluate and resolve controversial self-defense fact patterns, such as battered
woman's syndrome, depending upon their world views).
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those potential jurors who will be most inclined to accept the premise
that a punishment less than death will satisfy the needs of justice based
on their defendant's story for life.78
A.

The Importance of the First Ballot

In thinking about picking a jury that will be most receptive to the
case for life, it is critical for the defense attorney to realize at the outset
that every juror chosen matters. An understandable tendency exists to
think of a jury as a whole where twelve jurors must be persuaded at a
time, but analysis of first-vote thresholds reveals quite a different
phenomenon. At the penalty phase, if only five jurors-less than a
majority of the jury-vote for life on the first ballot, a life verdict is
almost certain to result. That is the good news for defense attorneys. The
bad news is that if nine or more jurors cast their ballots for death on the
first ballot, a death sentence frequently follows. The up-for-grabs
the final outcomes
situation is where there are eight votes for death, with
79
splitting roughly 60/40 in death and life outcomes.
This data highlights how many cases would be altered if only a
single juror had been persuaded to vote differently on the first ballot.
Only three votes for life or undecided on the first ballot? A death verdict
is very likely. Add one more vote for life or undecided? The odds of a
life verdict shoot up from almost nil to even. Add two votes for life or
undecided? The verdict will have swung from an almost guaranteed
death sentence to a life sentence as the number of votes for death falls
below eight. The unmistakable lesson for defense counsel is that if better
jury selection adds one or two more jurors sympathetic to the
defendant's case for life-indeed, adds one or two more jurors who will
simply vote "undecided" rather than for death-the dynamics of the jury
deliberation may be fundamentally altered and result in a life sentence. 80

78. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at Guideline 10.10.2, commentary.
79. See Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, ForecastingLife and
Death: Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 304
(2001) (analyzing South Carolina data of CJP); see also Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty's
Future: Charting the Crosscurrentsof DecliningDeath Sentences andthe Mc Veigh Factor,84 TEX.
L. REv. 1929, 1936 (2006) (discussing the effect of first ballot juror votes on sentence outcomes).
However, there are a number of documented cases where one juror was able to hold out for life
despite the fact that the other eleven jurors were committed to the death penalty.
80. Scott E. Sundby, War and Peace in the Jury Room: How Capital Juries Reach Unanimity
(forthcoming, on file with author) (exploring how life and death juries persuade holdouts to join the
majority).
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B. The Demographicsof Life
The challenge then lies in identifying those potential jurors who
will be most open to the case for life from among the pool of deathqualified jurors. Ideally, from defense counsel's perspective, one could
identify such jurors through a demographic profile. In a recent article,
Professors Eisenberg and Garvey analyzed the CJP data in an attempt to
identify the characteristics of the "merciful" juror, those jurors who were
most inclined to give "mercy" a role in his or her sentencing decision. 81
After analyzing the data, the authors determined that "high mercy
jurors" comprised about one-fifth (nineteen percent) of all the capital
jurors in their study.82 On the whole, these "high mercy jurors" were
more likely to believe that a sentence less than death could be an
appropriate punishment for intentional murder, 83 were more likely to feel
sympathy for the defendant,
and were more likely to downplay
considerations such as the retributive principle of an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth.85
Attitudes such as these could be expected to make "high mercy
jurors" more receptive to the defense's case in mitigation, and this is
borne out in the first votes cast at the penalty phase: while eighty percent
of "low mercy jurors" cast their first ballot for death, only forty-four
86
percent of the "high mercy jurors" voted for death on their first ballot.
Critically, therefore, the presence of more "high mercy jurors" on a jury
appears to significantly decrease the likelihood that the first ballot will
reach the critical threshold of eight votes necessary to make a death

81. Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen P. Garvey, The Merciful Capital Juror, 2 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 165 (2004). To identify a juror's mercy index, the study used questions centering on
whether the juror believed "mercy" was a proper part of his or her decision. Id at 180.
82. The majority of jurors (52%) were identified as middle-level mercy jurors and 29% were
low-level mercy jurors. Id. at 182 tbl.2.
83. Id. at 184-85.
84. Id. at 185.
85. Id. at 186 tbl.5.
86. Id. at 191 tbl.7. That almost half of the "high mercy" jurors cast their votes for death
might at first be surprising, but even "high mercy" jurors have said they could vote for death or they
could not sit on a capital jury. what qualifies as "high mercy" in a pool of capital jurors, therefore,
might be different than for jurors generally. And, while almost half of high mercy jurors voted for
death, that is still far lower than the eight of ten low-mercy jurors who voted for death. Similar
differences were seen in terms of how first ballots were cast for life, with 44% of "high mercy"
jurors voting for life compared to 9% of the "low mercy jurors" (11% of both the high- and lowmercy jurors voted "undecided" on the first ballot). Id. The first ballot percentages for those jurors
whom the authors identify as "middle mercy jurors" were, as would be expected, in between the
high- and low-mercy jurors: 50% for death, 37% for life and 12% undecided. Id.
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sentence possible, let alone the nine votes that almost always yields a
death sentence.
So what are the distinguishing characteristics of "high mercy
jurors"? The authors were able to use multiple regression analysis to
identify two factors that were statistically significant. First, the study
found that the likelihood of a juror being high-mercy rose along with the
juror's level of education; thus those jurors who had a high school
education or less were the most likely to fall in the low-mercy group,
while jurors with a college degree or higher were the most likely to be
high-mercy.87 In addition to education, the regression analysis revealed
that the likelihood of a juror falling in the high-mercy category was
positively correlated with regular attendance at religious services; the
key factor, at least for the group of South Carolina jurors studied, was
88
regular attendance of church services rather than denomination.
An additional demographic observation must be added when it
comes to first votes. Although the study just mentioned did not find 89a
correlation between race and the tendency to be a "high mercy juror,"
studies have found a correlation between race and first vote tendencies.
Specifically, African Americans jurors are more likely to cast their first
votes for life than jurors of other races. 90 Given the critical nature of the
first-vote tally, it does not matter of course why a particular juror is
voting for life or "undecided," 91 but simply whether his or her vote
might preclude the prosecution from reaching the eight-vote threshold
necessary to make a death sentence possible.
This potential for a juror's race to affect the dynamic of the jury
room, especially in certain types of cases, is strongly reinforced by a
study conducted by Professor William Bowers and his colleagues.
Examining the full CJP data base, the study found that in cases involving
an African American defendant accused of killing a white victim, the
seating of one African American male dramatically reduced the chances
87. Id. at 189 & n.61.
88. Id. at 190. The study controlled for membership in the Baptist, Southern Baptist, and
Methodist churches and found no statistical significance beyond the basic fact of attending religious
services regularly. Interestingly, though, in looking at likelihood of jurors casting their first vote for
life, Southern Baptists, although as "merciful" as regular churchgoers of other denominations, were
more likely to vote for death than members of other denominations. See Eisenberg et al., supra note
79, at 284-86.
89. In fact, African American male jurors were on balance less likely to be merciful than
other demographic groups, although not to a statistically significant level. Eisenberg & Garvey,
supra note 81, at 189. The study also found no correlation between gender and level of mercy. Id.
90. Eisenberg et al., supra note 79, at 298.
91. See generally Sundby, supranote 80 (surveying the various reasons why more jurors may
be voting for "life" on capital juries).
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of a death sentence; juries with one African American male juror
returned death sentences in 42.9% of such cases compared to
71.9% of
92
the cases where no African American males were on the jury.
It was not only the seating of African American male jurors,
however, that proved important. The number of white males on the jury
also proved to be an important predictive factor independent of whether
African American jurors were on the jury. Juries that heard cases
involving a black-on-white killing and had four or fewer white males on
the jury returned a death sentence in 30% of the cases; in striking
contrast, if the jury included five or more white males the chances of a
death sentence increased "dramatically,"
with 70.7% of such cases
93
resulting in death sentences.
While the Bowers study highlights the potential role of race in the
death penalty decision, the findings also reinforce the need to understand
that in any particular case the crucial question is how a juror's attitude
will match up with the case in mitigation being presented. The study
discovered, for instance, that the difference in the death sentence rate
reflects the fact that African American male jurors (and to a lesser extent
African American female jurors) were more likely in black-on-white
killings 94 to see the defendant as remorseful, to believe that the
defendant's background had adversely influenced his life, to have
lingering doubts about the defendant's role in the crime, and to believe
95
that the defendant did not pose a future danger if given a life sentence.
Thus, although as a group African American male jurors are not
particularly "merciful" when asked about mercy in the abstract,96 as a
group they exhibited attitudes apart from "mercy" that in certain types of
cases made them more receptive to the case in mitigation than jurors
with different demographics.
Studies of capital jurors, therefore, provide some general
demographic insights into which jurors are most likely to vote for life on
the first ballot: jurors with higher levels of education, those who
frequently attend religious services, and African American male jurors
where there is a black-on-white killing and the defendant's background
is a key part of the mitigation case. The importance of these findings,

92. William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An EmpiricalAnalysis of
the Role ofJurors'RaceandJury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 193 (2001).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 241-44. These differences in perception existed in all cases, but were particularly
noticeable when a black defendant was accused of killing a white victim.
95. Id. at215-26.
96. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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however, is not that they can serve as a concrete guide to jury selection.
They cannot; in many cases, the strongest voice for death in the jury
room was a juror who possessed one or more of those characteristics.
Rather, their importance is in highlighting that individual jurors
will have attitudes and a world view that will influence how receptive
they are to the defendant's case for life. The key, therefore, is to find the
"merciful" juror, whether she has earned a high school degree or a
doctorate, or the juror who will be open to the idea that the defendant's
background shaped his life, whatever her race or religious views. Certain
demographic groups may on average subscribe more to these views than
other groups, and this makes aggressive Batson97 challenges to
prosecution strikes of African Americans crucial. Nonetheless, juries are
comprised of individuals and not averages, and knee-jerk responses to a
juror's race are as dangerous as ignoring such responses by the
prosecution.
C. Life-QualifyingJury Selection
When it comes to selecting a jury most receptive to a case for life,
defense attorneys must think not only in terms of whom they want
seated on the jury, but also whom they must avoid seating. The CJP has
found that a number of death qualified jurors who have served on juries
appear to view the death penalty as the only acceptable punishment for
an intentional murder. 98 If such jurors truly are unable to give full
consideration to a life sentence, then their service is contrary to the law,
as the Supreme Court has held that jurors "who will automatically vote
for the death penalty in every case" cannot sit on capital cases. 99
The uncovering of jurors who cannot give full consideration to life
sentences (sometimes referred to as "reverse- Witherspoon excludables"),
however, is not as easy as it may first appear. This is in part because the
voir dire may not be sufficiently probing to uncover that a potential juror
should in fact be excluded. A cursory question to the potential juror of
whether she automatically would impose the death penalty for capital
murder, for example, may lead to the honest response that she would
97. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting racially motivated exercise of
peremptory challenges).
98. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & A. Brian Threlkeld, Probing "Life
Qualification" Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1209, 1220-24, 1237 (2001)
(citing data from South Carolina and Kentucky showing that some jurors who have actually served
in capital cases hold the view that the death penalty is the only acceptable punishment upon a
murder conviction).
99. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
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not. If the venireperson was asked further, however, to describe the type
of case in which she would not impose the death penalty, some would
give examples such as cases involving self-defense, accident, or insanity.
The problem is that the venireperson is not a lawyer, and quite
understandably does not know that such cases would never qualify for a
capital murder conviction; consequently, some are honestly answering
the question that they would not impose the death penalty for all murder
without realizing that their examples would never qualify as capital
murder in the first place. If capital murder were fully defined and
explained, so that possibilities like self-defense were clearly excluded,
then reverse- Witherspoonjurors would better be able to be identified by
their answers to whether they would be unable to fully consider the
posssibility of a life sentence.100
More thorough questioning on the definition of capital murder by
itself, however, does not ensure that jurors will be chosen who can give
effect to a case's mitigating evidence. Again, the problem is not the
disingenuous or dishonest venireperson, but the individual who can
imagine a specific type of "mitigation" that would lead them to impose a
sentence of life-for example, brain damage-but would not accept as
mitigating the actual evidence that the defense will offer, such as child
abuse or substance addiction. Consequently, although such jurors might
at first sound like they can sit on the jury since they are stating that they
are capable of considering mitigating evidence, in the case they must
actually decide, their attitudes will preclude them from considering
mitigating evidence.' 0 '
The necessity of screening for jurors who cannot give effect to the
defense's mitigating evidence makes plain how vital it is for defense
02
counsel to utilize a number of tools for meaningful voir dire.'
Techniques essential to ensuring adequate voir dire include:
1) questionnaires; 2) individual, sequestered voir dire; 3) judicial
phrasing of voir dire that makes clear the nature of mitigation; and
4) questioning that inquires into the juror's ability to give consideration
to the specific type of mitigation evidence upon which the defense's case
for life is built.'0 3

100. See Blume et al., supra note 98, at 1244-45 (discussing the misconceptions ofjurors as to
the meaning of "murder" under the law and how this prevents effective voir dire).
101. Seeid. at 1228-31.
102. See ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 3, at Guideline 10.10.2(B).
103. Blume et al., supra note 98, at 1247-64 (proposing a variety of techniques essential to
ensuring adequate voir dire of potential capital jurors).
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Defense counsel's need to engage in effective voir dire, however,
extends beyond simply finding those venirepersons who should be
excluded for cause. As we have stressed from the outset, the normative,
moral judgment that is required of the jurors in choosing between life
and death will bring into direct play their world views and values in
evaluating the evidence. Interviews with capital jurors have consistently
found that attitudes on certain issues are more likely to lead a juror to
favor a death sentence. The attitudes predisposing a juror towards death
include: a strong belief in free will, an emphasis on personal
responsibility, and a skepticism about the criminal justice system's
ability to deal with prisoners (including a belief that life without parole
does not guarantee a defendant will not be released).10 4 Similarly, if a
juror identifies with the victim in the case and perceives the defendant
as
05
remorseless, the juror is more likely to favor a death sentence.'
Perhaps most influential, though, is the tendency of jurors who
strongly favored the death penalty to subscribe to a fundamental belief
that, for certain types of crimes, the only way to right the "moral
10 6
balance" given the victim's loss of life is to take the defendant's life.
This viewpoint, not surprisingly, led such jurors to find little of merit in
the mitigating evidence, to have difficulty even recalling the details of
the case for life, and even to see themselves as the victim's advocate in
the jury room; jurors of a religious bent who represented this spectrum
of capital jurors were the ones most likely to express their views through
the recitation of the principle of "an eye for an eye."'0 7 The fewer the
jurors holding such views that are seated, the greater the chance that the
defendant's mitigating evidence will receive full consideration in the
jury room.
On the other end of the spectrum of death qualified jurors are those
whose attitudes make them more receptive to the idea of mitigation.
104. See ScOTr E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH
PENALTY 125-30 (2005) (discussing attitudes common among jurors who favored a death sentence);
Blume et al., supra note 7, at 404 (discussing the effects of juror beliefs on the length of time
defendant will be imprisoned); William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An
Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REv. 605,

716-17 (1999) ("There is a pervasive misimpression among jurors that convicted first-degree
murderers not given the death penalty will be released on parole well before they actually
are ...").

105. See generally Eisenberg et al., supra note 8 (discussing the correlation between a
defendant's remorse and the sentence imposed by the jury); Sundby, supra note 8 (exploring the
effect of a defendant's remorse on capital jurors); Sundby, supra note 43 (discussing the role of
victims and the effect of defendant's remorse on sentencing).
106. See Sundby, supra note 79, at 1959-61.
107. SUNDBY, supra note 104, at 125-30 (describing attitudes of "fundamentalist" jurors).
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These jurors tend to see individuals as shaped, at least in part, by their
environment and the events of their lives; as a general proposition, such
jurors were more open to expert testimony suggesting that the
defendant's actions had been influenced by mental illness or life events.
They also tend to be more open to the idea that people can change for
the better, including positively adapting to prison, and also tend to
believe that an individual may still do some good in the world even after
causing great harm. While not necessarily religious, jurors who
exhibited strong inclinations towards a life sentence often expressed
their views in terms of "redemption"; such jurors could be characterized
as "hope jurors," because the idea of "hope" was a theme that ran
through many of their interviews. ° 8 This group of jurors, not
surprisingly, was the most open to the idea that the "moral balance"
could be regained by a sentence of less than death, especially if they
thought the defendant was still capable of achieving some good while
serving the rest of his life in prison.
The need to think through carefully how the mitigation evidence
will be received by a potential juror is emphasized by a particular subset
of jurors: those who share on some level the defendant's mitigation
history. As a first reaction, this group of jurors might seem like an
audience that would be empathetic to the defendant's case for life. This
reaction would be wrong, though, as such jurors consistently were
among the strongest advocates for death in the jury room. Upon further
reflection this finding may not be so surprising once it is remembered
that a consistent theme in many penalty phase deliberations is whether,
despite the facts in mitigation, the defendant could still have exercised
his "free will." Jurors who identified with the defendant often saw
themselves as living proof that the defendant had made a "free choice"
to go down the road that led to the murder, and, as a result, were often
highly critical of the defense's suggestion that the defendant was
influenced by events beyond his control. One juror's reaction to a drug
expert presented by the defense both illustrates this tendency of jurors to
negate the defendant's evidence based on their own experiences and
their skepticism of professional experts suggesting otherwise:
Juror: [The expert] talked about methamphetamines and that they
can make you not aware of your doings and such. .... I thought it was
a crock, because when I was in college. .. I did this stuff....
Interviewer: Have you used methamphetamines?
108. Id. at 73-74 (describing attitudes of "hope" jurors).
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Juror: Yeah, yeah so when I was sitting there listening to this drug
expert I was thinking, "Have you ever done this stuff?" Do you
actually know what was, I mean, is this all just text book knowledge?
Because he knew nothing.... I had done this stuff, I know, and
everything he was saying was just so far-fetched. I wondered where
he got all this from.
Interviewer: Did you share that with the jury?
Juror: Oh yeah. Because there was another girl in there too, she
was a former addict and.., a recovering alcoholic, and she told the
jury too, "I've done this stuff. ..

."

We both told the jury, "I've used

it, I've done it, and I would no more go out and say, 'Let's go kill
somebody today and let's get cash and get more drugs."' I never was
up for four or five or six days as he apparently was. Even so, when
you do the drugs you know it's illegal, you know
it's wrong, so I just
09
believe you're responsible for your actions.

On the other hand, jurors who identified not with the defendant but
with a sympathetic figure in the defendant's life-like a well-meaning
mother or father-were far more open to the idea that an individual
might be led astray by others. A juror who was married to an alcoholic,
for instance, is likely to be open to a mother's testimony that the
defendant had been beaten and raised in a dysfunctional home because
the father was an abusive alcoholic; a juror who like the defendant's
father struggled to keep his son out of a gang in an area where gang
membership was rampant may be particularly receptive to the idea that
social pressures can be powerful influences. ° The broad lesson of
findings such as these is that the defense constantly must be thinking
about which jurors are most likely to be open to consideration of the
defendant's story for life. The finest Picasso will not be appreciated by
someone who believes abstract art is not really art, no matter how many
art experts extol the painting's virtues. In short, the audience matters,
and an integral part of being an effective lawyer is conducting jury
selection in a manner that ensures that the mitigation evidence will be
heard by a group of jurors capable of giving the evidence its fullest
effect. I"'

109. Sundby, supra note 24, at 1137 (alteration in original).
110. SUNDBY, supranote 104, at 114-15.
Ill. See Blume et al., supranote 98, at 1258-59.
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D. Empowering the Jurorsto Give Life
After choosing a jury that is properly selected to be open to
mitigating evidence, defense counsel needs to give the jurors the ability
to act upon the evidence. On the most basic level this means explaining
the concept of mitigating evidence and its role in the penalty decision.
This may sound unnecessary given that the jury will be provided with
jury instructions, but the CJP has found that confusion over jury
instructions abounds for critical topics like burdens of proof and future
dangerousness. 112 Perhaps of greatest concern for our purposes is that
jurors consistently express uncertainty as to what they could consider as
mitigation and how it was to play into their decision; more than one
juror has stated that they were even uncertain what the word
"mitigating" meant.' 13
It is critical, therefore, that defense counsel explain early and often,
in ways that the average juror can understand, the nature of the death
penalty decision and what use should be made of the mitigation evidence
they have heard. Words that lawyers do not even think twice about-like
"mitigation" or "heinous"--may be completely foreign to jurors who do
not deal with the law or complete the New York Times crossword puzzle.
Counsel must repeatedly stress that jurors never have to impose the
death penalty and that they can always choose life imprisonment without
parole as the appropriate sentence. It is also important that counsel make
sure that jurors understand that whether a particular piece of evidence is
mitigation, as well as how much weight to give that evidence, is
completely up to the individual juror and it does not matter whether
other jurors agree with their assessment. Indeed, given that the role of
mitigating evidence should be explored thoroughly at voir dire,' 14 the
education of jurors should begin even prior to trial on the
role of
5
mitigating evidence if the case proceeds to the penalty phase."
Anticipating the difficulties that jurors may have with form jury
instructions, defense counsel can propose elaborations of standard

112. See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 49, at 9-12; see, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Free v. Peters, 806 F.
Supp. 705 (N.D. I1. 1992) (summarizing research of Hans Zeisel); Shari Seidman Diamond &
Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79
JUDICATURE 224, 224 (1996); James Luginbuhl, Comprehension of Judges' Instructions in the
Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial: Focus on Mitigating Circumstances, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
203, 217 (1992); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions:
Guidedor Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1169 (1995).
113.

SUNDBY,supra note 104, at 166-67.

114. See supranotes 101-03 and accompanying text.
115. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at Guideline 10.11(L).

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1035

instructions based on supporting case law.' 16 This may be especially
important given that the jury instructions-no matter how poorly
worded-are likely to be a centerpiece of the jury's deliberations as they
attempt to puzzle out the law's requirements. In some jurisdictions
mitigating evidence also may be listed in some manner, either through
statutory mitigating factors or proposed mitigation findings. While the
listing has the benefit of making clear to the jury that what the defense
has presented is "evidence" they can legitimately consider, defense
counsel must guard against letting the statutory mitigating factors
"drive" their case in mitigation and in the process diverting their focus
from the necessity of weaving all of the mitigating evidence-statutory
17
and non-statutory-into a convincing overall story for life.'
Verdict forms can also play a critical role in structuring how the
jury approaches the mitigating evidence. At a minimum, therefore,
defense counsel must make sure that the verdict forms are a proper
representation of the legal process and are not susceptible to an
inadvertent interpretation that denigrates the proper role of the
mitigating evidence. Finally, defense counsel must be prepared to
protect their mitigating evidence by explaining to the jury in closing
argument how they are allowed to use the mitigation in reaching their
verdict.
In choosing the wording of proposed jury instructions, the structure
of verdict forms, and which closing arguments to present, defense
116. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at Guideline 10.11(K). In one study, revised
instructions aimed at making the instructions on mitigation clearer did improve comprehension from
52% to 67% (and with improved comprehension, the jurors were more likely to vote for life). Even
a 67% rate, however, means that almost one-third of those tested were still applying the law
incorrectly. Diamond & Levi, supra note 112, at 230-31. Virginia's rules provide that a judge is
obligated to give a requested jury instruction if based on judicial authority. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2263.2 (2004).
117. In other words, establishing statutory mitigating factors alone will not tell the compelling
story for life that needs to be presented to the jury. Just as an author could not write a novel by
telling isolated vignettes about a character, the lawyer must make sure that the mitigating factors
come together in a manner that the jury will understand and respond to in making their decision. See
supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text. Statutory mitigating factors also can carry the danger of
being phrased in a way that the mitigating evidence does not quite fit, and the jury may not
understand they are still allowed to consider it as non-statutory mitigation, or may erroneously
believe that the evidence is not as important because it is not within the statute (and thus the jury
instructions). Florida, for example, uses a typical statutory mitigating factor that the crime "was
committed while.., under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141(6)(b) (West 2006). The danger exists that some jurors will focus on the statutory
language that the disturbance be "extreme" and dismiss as invalid or as legally unimportant any
evidence that in their view does not reach the level of "extreme." Yet, such evidence may be an
important part of the defense's overall case for life (such as a depressive state), even if not
"extreme."
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counsel must think about how the mitigating evidence is likely to be
used by the juror in the jury room. Juries often respond to the
monumental decision with the conflicting claims that confront them by
making lists and charts. One type of chart is a "time line" of the
defendant's life, where the jury is looking for any perceived
opportunities for the defendant to have taken the high road.118 This is the
situation where the defense's coherent story for life can play a critical
role in shaping the time line so that the jury will understand the murder
as part of a complex tableau of forces and events.
A second type of chart commonly employed is a "list" or
"weighing" chart where the jury will list the aggravating factors on one
side and mitigating factors on the other side.1 19 Consequently, defense
counsel should anticipate that their case for life will likely be
represented in list form at some point and thus try to shape how that list
looks. Equally important, they should realize how this kind of chart is
likely to be used by those jurors arguing for a death sentence: The most
common (and powerful) argument made by jurors favoring death to
those jurors favoring life is that they are being too emotional and not
following the law. In making this argument, pro-death jurors are likely
to use the list as a way to be "objective" and take the emotion out of the
weighing process. The fact is that much of what may be powerful
mitigation-for instance, the hope of redemption or having suffered a
traumatic event as a child-does not necessarily list well on a chart,
especially when there is a long list of crimes on the other side of the list.
It is absolutely critical, therefore, that defense counsel make clear,
beginning with voir dire and throughout the trial, that the law embraces
as mitigation the type of evidence that they will present in the
defendant's case. Defense lawyers must anticipate that those jurors who
will be arguing for life in the jury room are likely to be challenged by
other jurors as not "following the law" because they are reacting
"emotionally" to the mitigating evidence. And if the lawyers anticipate
this argument, they can empower jurors by helping them understand that
just because they find it difficult to articulate precisely why they believe
the evidence is mitigating, or just because a reason does not "list" well,
does not make their reaction to it "emotional" or "unlawful." Rather,
mitigating evidence is at the core of how our legal system structures the
death penalty decision, and a juror who gives it voice is not only
operating within the law, but with the law's blessing.

118. Sundby, supra note 24, at 1136; Sundby, supra note 80.
119. SUNDBY,supra note 104, at 50-51.
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CONCLUSION

Preparing the defense of a capital case is an "awesome
responsibility"-and an awful lot of work. The capital defense team not
only must gain command of an intricate and demanding body of case
law, but must be able to construct a "story for life" that appeals to a
juror's normative and moral sense. The wealth of empirical data on the
nature of mitigation strongly reinforces the ABA Guidelines'
fundamental premise: the construction of an effective case in mitigation
can only be accomplished through a painstaking and detailed
investigation of every aspect of the defendant's life from a multidisciplinary perspective. Moreover, the empirical studies reveal that the
uncovering of mitigation is only the first step in effective capital
representation. The defense team also must understand how the jury is
likely to respond to different types of themes and evidence, both so that
they will shape the presentation of their narrative in the most effective
way, and so that the jury is composed of people for whom the narrative
has the greatest chance of resonating. While much remains to be done to
ensure that capital defendants receive adequate representation, both the
ABA Guidelines and the Supplementary Guidelines constitute an
important step in reaffirming those minimal standards necessary to give
mitigation its full role at a capital trial, and to assure the capital
defendant the representation promised to him by the Sixth Amendment.

